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i

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the injury
sustained by Plaintiff on July 11, 1984 is a compensable industrial accident arising out of or in the course of his employment
within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-45 (1984).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves review of the final administrative decision of the Utah Industrial Commission of March 25, 1985 denying
workers1 compensation benefits to the Plaintiff on the exclusive
basis that a compensable accident within the meaning of Utah Code
Annotated §35-1-45 (1984) did not occur.
On July 11, 1984 the Plaintiff, a self-employed, 45-year-old
truck driver was injured when he suffered a back injury during a
long haul trip to the eastern United States when he stopped at a
rest stop in the state of Massachusetts.

Tr. 23, 105.

After

driving for approximately six hours, Plaintiff and his wife who
was accompanying him on this fateful trip, stopped at a rest area
near Boston, Massachusetts.
stiffness

Tr. 105.

Plaintiff, experiencing

in his lower back area, alighted

from his truck and

started walking toward the restroom when he slipped on an oil
spill, causing him to jerk in order to maintain his balance.
25, 26, 105.

Tr.

Although Plaintiff did not think anything of this

slip at this time, he did experience pain in his right leg and in
his side from his hip to his shoulder.
Upon returning

Tr. 26.

from the restroom, Plaintiff bent

over to

inspect one of the tires on his truck, and while in a crouched
position, experienced an immediate sharp pain in his lower back
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that caused him to fall onto the ground, where he landed on his
arms and jaw.

Tr. 28-29, 105.

Following his collapse, Plaintiff

was not able to get up from the ground until his wife assisted
him.

Tr. 105.

Due to the Plaintiff's suffering, his wife was

forced to drive the truck for the remainder of the trip. Tr. 30,
105.
When they arrived

in Georgia, the Plaintiff contacted Dr.

James D. Salisbury, who had to go to Plaintiff's motel room to
pick him up and transport him to the doctor's office.

Tr. 31.

Dr. Salisbury treated Plaintiff on July 13, 1984, two days after
the

accident,

and

expressed

his

opinion

that

problems were at least aggravated by his job.

the Plaintiff's

Tr. 81, 105.

Upon returning to Salt Lake City, Utah, Plaintiff made an
appointment to see Dr. Greg Molis.

Tr. 106.

The medical records

of both Dr. Salisbury and Dr. Molis corroborate Plaintiff's description of his injury with regard to his bending over and experiencing

the

sharp

pain which

caused

him

to fall onto

the

ground. Tr. 105, 106.
An Application for Hearing was filed on October 10, 1984,
and a hearing was held on January 17, 1985.
Fact, Conclusions

of Law

and Order

of

The Findings of

the Administrative Law

Judge denying benefits include the following:
1.

ii

"It is undisputed that the [Plaintiff] suffered a back

injury on or about July 11, 1984, during a long haul trip to the
eastern United States." (emphasis added).
2.

"It is undisputed

Tr. 105.

that on or about July 11, 1984 the

[Plaintiff] injured his back when he stopped at a rest stop someDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

where in the state of Massachusetts."
3.

J_c[. (emphasis added),

The Plaintiff "... bent over slightly to inspect one of

his tires, and in doing so he [sic] experienced a sharp pain in
his back that caused him to fall completely onto the ground where
he landed on his arms and jaw," Id. (emphasis added),
4.

The Plaintiff "... was unable to get up off the ground

and was experiencing pain all the way up his spine and down his
right leg to his knee." Id.
5.
driving

There is "... little doubt that the fatigue generated by
long

distances

might

well

precipitate back

aches and

pains . ..." _Id_. (emphasis added).
6.

The Order also acknowledged the well-known medical fact

that ".•. the mere act of bending over subjects the lumbar spine
to considerable stress.11
7.

Tr. 106.

"There is good reason to believe that this injury was

work-related

in the sense that this was a result of fatigue and

strain on the [Plaintiff's] back."

Tr. 107.

On February 22, 1985, the Administrative Law Judge denied
Plaintiff's claim for entitlement to workers1 compensation benefits in connection with his injury of July 11, 1984 because

ff

.. .

the evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding that [the injury] was the result of a compensable industrial accident."
107.

Tr.

On March 6, 1985, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Review,

including a supporting memorandum, with the Industrial Commission
challenging the Administrative Law Judge's Order.

Tr. 110-114.

On March 25, 1985 the Industrial Commission summarily denied the
Motion for Review.

Tr. 121.

On April 24, 1985, a Petition for a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Writ of Review was filed with the Court requesting further review
of the Plaintiff's claim.

Tr. 123.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff submits that Utah Code Annotated §35-1-45 (1984),

*

and decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, support the position
that
dent.

he

experienced

a compensable

industrial

injury by acci-

Specifically, the injuries suffered occurred while the

<

Plaintiff was working, are identifiable as to date, time, location and consistent

incident description, and his fall to the

ground landing on his arms and jaw is unquestionably an unsusal,
work-related event.

4

The sudden sharp pain which the Plaintiff

experienced and which caused him to fall essentially uncontrollably to the ground landing on his arm and jaw certainly qualifies as an accident as most people would define it.

|

That he was

unable to stand up, and as noted by the Administrative law Judge,
required the assistance of his wife in doing so, underscores the

4

seriousness of that event.
In addition, the fatigue generated by driving long distances
can unduly strain the lumbar area of a back, and is not such a
strain that can readily be equated with the normal activities of
daily living.

The medical opinion of the first doctor who exam-

ined the Plaintiff that his problems were at least aggravated by
his work emphasizes this uncontroverted medical opinion.

This

medical finding when coupled with the acknowledged medical fact
of the basic nature of lumbar stress further substantiates the
finding of the occurrence of a compensable industrial accident.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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*

And

finally,

and

notwithstanding

all of

the above which

singularly and cumulatively support the finding of the occurrence
of a compensable event, in cases where it is difficult to determine whether an unusual circumstance occured, the benefit of the
doubt should go to the injured employee.
ARGUMENT
I
EVERY EMPLOYEE WHO IS INJURED BY ACCIDENT
ARISING OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HIS
EMPLOYMENT SHALL BE PAID COMPENSATION FOR
LOSS SUSTAINED ON ACCOUNT OF THE INJURY
Utah
part that

Code Annotated

§35-1-45

"Every employee

(1984) provides

... who is injured

in material

... by accident

arising out of or in the course of his employment

... shall be

paid compensation....11
In the present case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff suffered a back injury on or about July 11, 1984 during a long haul
trip to the eastern United States.

Tr. 105.

istrative Law Judge readily conceded

In fact, the Admin-

that the Plaintiff's in-

juries were work-related by finding that

!f

it is undisputed that

the [Plaintiff] suffered a back injury on or about July 11, 1984
during a long haul trip to the eastern United States."
(emphasis added).

Tr. 105

He underscored this finding by concluding that

"It is undisputed that on or about July 11, 1984 the [Plaintiff]
injured his back when he stopped at a rest stop somewhere in the
state of Massachusetts."^, (emphasis added).
The Administrative Law Judge also found that there could be
"...

little doubt

that

the fatigue generated by driving long

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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distances might well precipitate back aches and pain . . . ." Id,
(emphasis

added).

Interestingly

enough,

the

injury

occurred

after the Plaintiff had been driving approximately six hours when
fatigue forced him to stop at a rest area.
Having

satisfied

Tr. 105.

the "arising out of or in the course of

employment11 requirement, Plaintiff must next satisfy the "accident11 requirement referred to in the statute.
The

Utah

Sabo, 642 P.2d

Supreme

Court

in Sabo's Electronic

Services

v.

722, 725 (Utah 1982), defined the term accident

as :
[A]n
unanticipated,
unintended
occurrence
different from what would normally be expected
to occur in the usual course of events. The
accident must result in an injury which is
causally related to the work being done. The
mere showing of an injury does not ipso facto
mean
that
a
compensable
accident
has
occurred.
In Sabo this Court reversed the decision of the Industrial Commission concluding that although the defendant was injured while
lifting a box at work
defendant1 s injury

fl

[i]t appears to be mere coincidence that

or malfunction

occurred

at work."

_Id_. at

726.
The Administrative Law Judge, in describing the industrial
event recited that the Plaintiff "... bent over slightly to inspect one of his tires, and in doing so he [sic] experienced a
sharp pain in his back that caused him to fall completely on the
ground where he landed on his arm and jaw".

Tr. 105.

The Admin-

istrative Law Judge continued his analysis by finding that the
Plaintiff "... was unable to get up off the ground and was experDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iencing pain all the way up his spine and down his right leg to
his knee. _Idk

Therefore, the sudden sharp pain which the Plain-

tiff experienced and which caused him to fall to the ground is
certainly not a usual work-related event and unquestionably constitutes an industrial accident.

Similarly, that he was unable

to stand up and in fact required the assistance of his wife in
doing so emphasizes the seriousness of that injury.
readily

acknowledged

by

the Administrative

All of this,

Law Judge, further

substantiates the Plaintiff's claim to benefits.
In addition, the Administrative Law Judge's acknowledgement
that fatigue generated by driving long distances could well have
precipitated back aches and pains further underscores the industrial nature of the Plaintiff's injury. That the first doctor he
saw

indicates

problem

that

the

incident

is uncontroverted

at

least

in the record

aggravated his back
and

is certainly one

which should have at least generated further review by a medical
panel.

This concession constitutes an alternative basis for a

finding of the occurrence of a legally compensable
injury.

industrial

It cannot effectively be argued that the strains to the

lumbar area of a back by a long distance truck driver can be
equated
Computer

with normal activities of daily living.
Corp.

v.

Tarango,

Utah,

674

P.2d

See Billings

104

(1983)

and

Kincheloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ogden, Utah, 656 P.2d 440
(1982).

That the injury occurred after the Plaintiff had been

driving six hours underscores this additional alternative basis
for recovery.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court later summarized
Corporation

the Sabo decision in Kennecott

v. Georgas, Utah, 675

P.2d

1187, 1191

(1983) by

stressing two factors as being the essence of that decision:
[I]n Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, [citation omittedj, we denied recovery for a herniated disc caused by pre-existing back problems
from another job, and which manifested itself
when the employee engaged in lifting activities which were not strenuous and could have
happened anywhere. See also Billings Computer
Corporation v. Tarango, 674 P. 2d 104 (Utah

1983).
Applying this reasoning to the facts of the instant case, a clear
and

unambiguous

suffer

distinction

from pre-existing

various other

appears: first, Plaintiff

back

problems

though he has

injuries during his lifetime.

did not
suffered

Tr. 34-39

-- in

fact, the record is devoid of any evidence of any back condition
which

pre-existed

the work-related

injury;

and

second, Plain-

tiff's injury occurred after he had driven his truck for approximately six hours -- which is most certainly a strenuous activity
-- and after he had slipped on an oil spill. Tr. 25, 26.
Administrative Law Judge readily acknowledged that

The

ff

[t]here can

be little doubt that the fatigue generated by driving long distances might well precipitate back aches and pains."

Tr. 106.

Plaintiff also testified that he experienced pain after slipping
in the oil.

Tr. 26.

Thus, it cannot be logically concluded that

Plaintifffs injuries could have happened anywhere else; nor can
it be seriously contended that the lumbar stresses which a long
haul truck driver is subjected to can be equated to the activities of normal daily living.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Therefore, the combination of the long drive, the slip in
the oil, and the bending over to check a tire on the truck, constitute "an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from
what would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of
events11, i.e., an accident.

Sabo, supra at 725.

Hence, the

decision of the Industrial Commission and the denial of benefits
based thereon should be reversed.
The

instant

case must

also be distinguished

from Redman

Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 454 P.2d 283
(1969) where the Supreme Court held that the evidence failed to
establish that the employee's back ailment was caused by an accident.

The Court was apparently concerned that an award of bene-

fits where the record is devoid of any evidence showing an unusual event or accident would insure every truck driver, and many
others, "against a physiological malfunction or physical collapse
of any of hundreds of human organs, completely unproven as to
cause, but compensable only by virtue of the happenstance that
the malfunction, collapse or injury occurred while the employee
was on the job, and not home or elsewhere."

Jj^. at 285.

As stressed above, the facts of this case bridge the concerns expressed by the Court in Redman.

This is not a case where

one of the hundreds of human organs malfunctioned, but is a case
where

an employee suffered

a painful injury after driving his

truck for six hours, slipping on an oil spill and then bending
over to check a tire on his truck.

This unusual chain of events,

which is acknowledged by the Administrative Law Judge, is what
caused the Plaintiff's injuries. Tr. 105.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

II
IN CASE THERE IS ANY DOUBT RESPECTING THE
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION, SUCH DOUBT SHOULD
BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE EMPLOYEE
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that one of the
permanent purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act is to protect
the employee and those dependent upon him in the event the employee is seriously injured or killed.
mission, Utah, 610 P.2d

Prows v. Industrial Com-

1362, 1363 (1980), citing Chandler v.

Industrial Commission, Utah, 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020, 1021-1022,
(1919). To achieve this purpose the Court has consistently espoused the view that "in case there is any doubt respecting the
right to compensation, such doubt must be resolved in favor of
the employee.'1

Prows, supra at 1364.

See also McPhie v. Indus-

trial Commission, Utah, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (1977).

If such doubt

exists here, it should be resolved in favor of an award of benefits.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing argument, and upon all documents
and transcripts contained in the Court's record, it is respectfully submitted that the Industrial Commission's decision that a
compensable accident did not occur be reverse
DATED this 19th day of August, 1985.

DABNEY/l
VIRGINI
Attorney s for Plaintij
l

I
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Utah Code Annotated §35-1-45 (1984)
[Compensable Industrial Accident Defined]
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured,
and the dependents of every such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment, wherever
such

injury occurred,

inflicted,
account
nurse,

shall

be

if the accident was not purposely selfpaid

compensation

for

of the injury or death, and such
and

hospital

services

loss
amount

and medicines, and,

sustained

on

for medical,
in

case of

death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter.

The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical,

nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its
insurance carrier and not on the employee.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 84000897

RICHARD E. HOLLOWAY,
Applicant,
vs,
RICHARD E. HOLLOWAY TRUCKING and
STATE INSURANCE TUND,
Defendants,
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East 300
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on • January 17, 1985, at 8:30
o'clock a.m.. Said hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of
the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present, not represented by counsel.
The Defendants were represented by Mary A. Rudolph, Attorney at
Law.

The above matter came on regularly for hearing before Richard G.
Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge, on the 17th day of January, 1985. The
Applicant testified in his own behalf and the cl aims adjustor for the State
Insurance Fund, Sherie DeMastrie, testified as to the reasons why she denied
liability with respect to the Applicant's claim, The Applicant was attended
by two chiropractic physicians and the records of each were introduced as
evidence in the case. In addition, a statement regarding how the accident
occurred written by the Applicant's wife was also introduced in evidence. THe
issues in this case are as follows:
1. WAs the low back injury sustained by the Applicant on or about
July 11, 1984, the result of an injury by accident as that term is used in the
Workmen's Compensation Act of this State?
If the Applicant's injury is determined to have been the result of an
industrial accident, the following additional issues will need to be resolved:
2. What was the Applicant's average weekly wage at the time of his
industrial accident?

-13-
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RICHARD E. HOLLOWAY
ORDER
PAGE TWO

3. What is the extent of the Applicant's permanent partial
ment, if any, resulting from the industrial accident?
4.
What is the extent of the Applicant's * pre-existing
physical impairment attributable to all causes?
5.

For what

period

of

time was

the Applicant

temporarily

impair-

permanent

totally

disabled?
Having been fully advised in the
Judge now makes and enters the following

premises, the Administrative

Law

FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. It is undisputed that the Applicant suffered a back injury on or
about July 11, 1984, during a long haul trip to the eastern United States.
The Applicant is self-employed as the owner-operator of several trucks. On
this particular trip the Applicant was accompanied by his wife who is also a
truck driver. It is undisputed that on or about July 11, 1984, the Applicant
injured his back when he stopped at a rest stop somewhere in the State of
Massachusetts. Just how the injury occurred is disputed and this constitutes
the primary issue in this case. The Applicant testified that when he and his
wife pulled into this rest area that he was tired from having driven some six
hours or so and that he experienced the usual stiffness and achiness as he got
out of his truck. He then testified that as he started, walking towards the
restroom that he slipped on an oil spill causing . him to jerk in order to
maintain his balance. He thought nothing of the incident and proceeded to the
restroom. From the restroom he returned to his truck and decided to check his
tires. He then bent over slightly to inspect one of his tires and in doing so
he experienced a sharp pain in his back that caused him to fall completely
onto the ground where he landed on his arms and jaw. He described this as
almost one continuous motion. He says the pain hit him as he bent over and he
just kept going all the way to the ground. He was unable to get up off the
ground and was experiencing pain all the way up his spine and down his right
leg to his knee. He told his wife that he could not get up and at first she
thought he was joking. Finally, with the assistance of his wife, he was able
to get back into the truck but his wife drove the rest of the way.
The
following day the Applicant and his wife were dispatched with a load of beer
for delivery in Georgia and three or four days later they were dispatched from
Georgia to Utah with a load of plastic buckets.
When the Applicant arrived in Georgia he got a motel and then called
a chiropractor, Dr. James D. Salisbury, who treated him on July 13.
From Georgia the Applicant and his wife returned to Utah but did so
by going through Illinois so that they could visit with his folks and pick up
their children who were staying with his folks. They arrived back in Utah on

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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July 17, 1984, and the Applicant made an appointment to see a chiropractor the
following day, Dr. Greg Molis.
The records of Dr. Salisbury and Dr. Molis corroborate the
Applicant's description of his injury with regards to his having bent over and
experienced a sharp pain in his back but fall short of corroborating his
testimony of having slipped on an oil spill.
There can be little doubt that the fatigue generated by driving long
distances might well precipitate back aches and pains, and it is well known
that the mere act of bending over subjects the lumbar spine to considerable
stress. Dr. Salisbury thought the Applicant's problems were caused by his
job, or at least aggravated by his job, and Dr. Molis diagnosed his condition
as lumbar radiculitis with associated disc involvement and myofacitis.
Many states have enacted workmen's compensation laws to compensate
workers for work-related injuries. Utah has not done so and limits compensation to injuries by accident arising out of or sustained during the course of
employment.
It is essential, therefore, to determine whether or not the
Applicant's injury was the result of an industrial accident. It is not enough
that the injury occurred during the course of his employment if such injury
was merely a coincidence and the result of usual and commonplace activities
that could have occurred practically anywhere at any time.
(See Billings
Computer v. Tarango, 674 P.2nd 104, Utah, 1983.) The standard of compensability is set forth in the case of Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642
P.2nd 722, Utah, 1982, in which the Court said: .
Accident has been broadly defined as an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from what would normally be
expected in the usual course of events. The accident must
result in an injury which is causally related to the work
being done. The mere showing of injury does not ipso facto
mean that a compensable accident has occurred.
In the instant case, having considered the Applicant's testimony and
all of the evidence presented, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the
Applicant's injury was not the result of an industrial accident as that term
has been defined. In doing so, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the
mere act of bending over to check the tires was clearly not a compensable
industrial accident and the testimony of having slipped on an oil spill a few
minutes before while en route to the restroom does not constitute credible
evidence. The Administrative Law Judge does not believe the Applicant's
testimony in this regard to be credible for several reasons. First, there is
no mention anywhere of any such incident in the reports of Dr. Salisbury or
Dr. Molis. Nor is there any mention of such an incident in the Employer's
First Report of Injury filled out by the Applicant's wife, nor the claimant's
statement of how the injury occurred which was also filled out by the
Applicant's wife.
In short, there is no written corroboration of the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Applicant's testimony.
Furthermore, the testimony appears to have been
spawned as an afterthought which is perhaps understandable in light of the
Applicant's own admission that he did not regard the incident as significant.
The date of the alleged incident is referred to in Dr. Molis' report and in
the first report of injury as having occurred on June 11, 1984, rather than
July 11, 1984, and one is left to wonder if something perhaps did indeed occur
at that time. The Administrative Law Judge was not at all impressed with the
Applicant's explanations for failing to report the oil slip incident nor as to
why these reports reflect a June 11, 1984, date. Months afterward one would
be expected to confuse a June 11 date with a July 11 date but this is not a
satisfactory explanation just one week afterwards. The Applicant has had some
serious injuries in the past including a crushing injury to his leg in 1961
and a motorcycle accident in which he was thrown thirty to thirty-five feet
through the air.
He also was involved in a car accident and sustained an
injury to his knee when he was age fourteen. The Applicant testified that at
the time of his motorcycle accident he was in very good physical condition
weighing about 180 pounds and having a twenty-nine-inch waist but that because
of injuries sustained in that accident he has gained forty pounds and has lost
most of his muscle tone. This alone could seriously affect his ability to
avoid back injury.
2. The determination that the Applicant did not sustain an injury by
accident during the course of his employment is dispositive of the Applicant's
claim and there is no need to address the other issues presented in this case.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Applicant is not entitled to workmen's compensation benefits in
connection with the injury he sustained on or about July 11, 1984. There is
good reason to believe that this injury was work-related in the sense that it
was the result of fatigue and strain on the Applicant's back in connection
with his work as a truck driver but the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
finding that it was the result of a compensable industrial accident. Accordingly, the Applicant's claim must necessarily be denied.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of the Applicant be, and the
same is hereby, denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed this
Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.
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Richard G. Sumsion
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Coiranission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
JJMJ
day of February, 1985.
ATTEST:

/s/ Linda J. Strasburg
Linda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary
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VIRGINIUS DABNEY, ESQ.
DABNEY & DABNEY, P.C.
Attorneys for Applicant
Reams Building - Suite 412
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-9000
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH-

.8

DIVISION OF WDRKERS' COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND DISABILITY

9
10

RICHARD E. HOLLOWAY,
Applicant,

11
12
13
14
15
.

16

17
18
19
20

MOTION FOR REVIEW

-vsRICHARD E. HOLLOWAY TRUCKING [Employer], and the STATE INSURANCE
FUND [Carrier for the Employer,]

Case No. 84000897

Defendants,

COMES NOW Applicant, pursuant to the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure and
the Rule of the Industrial Ccamission of Utah, inter alia, and moves the
Ccamission for an Order reversing the decision of the Administrative Law Judge
dated February 22, 1985 wherein he held that the Applicant did not sustain a
compensable industrial accident. A Memorandum in Support, accompanies this
pleading.
'""
^
' ^
DATED this 6th day of March, 1 9 0 .

21
22
23
24

Attorneys for Applic
f

25

' 26
27

CERTIFICATE OF [flAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage pre-paid, on this the 6th day of March, 1985 to the
following:

23
3NEY A: DAB.NHY
5 S-:'-3!\3. 5»:TE ^'.2
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I
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Mary A. Rudolph, Esq.
261 East Broadway
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Mr. Richard E. Holloway
4537 South 4960 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
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VIRGINIUS DABNEY, ESQ.
DABNEY & DABNEY, P.C.
Attorneys for Applicant
Kearns Building - Suite 412
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-9000

6
7

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH

8

DIVISION OF M3RKERS' COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND DISABILITY

9
RICHARD E. HOLLOWAY,
10
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR REVIEW

Applicant,
11
-vs12
13
14

RICHARD E. HOLLOWAY TRUCKING [Employer], and the STATE INSURANCE
FUND [Carrier for the Employer,]

Case No. 84000897

Defendants,

15
16

COMES NOW Applicant, and submits his Memorandum in support of his

17

position that he experienced

18

Annotated §35-1-45 (1953, as amended), for the following reasons:

19

an injury by accident pursuant to Utah Code

1. The Administrative Law Judge readily conceded that the Applicant's

20

injuries were work-related.

21

that the Applicant suffered a back injury on or about July 11, 1984, during a

22

long haul trip to the Eastern United States." (emphasis added), Findings of

23

Fact No. 1, Order, p. 2. He underscored this finding by reiterating that "It

24

is undisputed that on or about July 11, 1984, the Applicant injured his back

25

when he stopped at a rest stop somewhere in the state of Massachusetts.

26

(emphasis

27

unquestionably work-related.

28

2. The Administrative

added.)

Id.

Order, p. 3. In fact, he stated "It is undisputed

Therefore,

Law Judge

the Applicant's

in describing

)ABNEY \" DABNEY
>3N3

3-rLOINO.

25
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injuries

were

the industrial event

1
2

recited that the Applicant "... bent over slightly to' inspect one of his

2

tires, and in doing do he [sic] experienced a sharp pain in his back that

A

caused him to fall completely onto the ground where he larded on his arms and

c

jaw." (emphasis added) JW.

g

was unable to get up off the ground and was experiencing pain all the way up

j

his spine and down his right leg to his knee." _Ld. Therefore, the sudden

g

sharp pain which the Applicant experienced and which caused him to fall

$

essentially uncontrollably to the ground landing on his arms and jaw is

-.Q

certainly not a usual work related event and unquestionably constitutes a

11

significant industrially related accident.

12

stand

13

assistance of his wife in doing so, emphasizes the seriousness of that injury.

14

JW. All of this, readily acknowledged by the Administrative Law Judge further

15

substantiates the Applicant's claim to workers' compensation benefits.

15

He continued by finding that the Applicant "...

i

(

Similarly, that he was unable to

up, and. as noted by the Administrative Law Judge, required

the

%

3. The Administrative Law Judge also readily acknowledged that there

17

could be "...

little doubt that the fatigue generated by driving long

18

distances might well precipitate back aches and pains ...." (emphasis added).

19

J^.

20.

finding of the occurrence of a legally compensable

21

Certainly, it cannot effectively be argued that the strains to the lonbar area

22

of a back by a long distance truck driver can be equated with normal

23

activities of daily living. See Kincheloe v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Ogden,

24

No. 17624 (November 5, 1982) and Billings Ccmputer Corp. v. Tarango, No. 18931

25

(November 10, 1983).

26

noted by the Administrative Law Judge occurred after the Applicant had been

27

driving approximately six hours while on a long haul trip to the Eastern

28

United States!

This finding and concession constitutes an alternative basis for a
industrial

injury.

Interestingly enough, the occurrence of this injury, as
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1
2
3
4
5

4.

The AdministraCivbe Law Judge acknowledged Che well known medical

face that "... the mere act of bending over subjects the lumbar spine to
considerable stress." Finding of Fact, No. 1, Order, p. 3.

Even Dr. Salisbury

expressed the opinion that the Applicant's problems were at least aggravated

6

by his job.

7

medical fact of the basis nature of lumbar stress further substantiates the

8

finding of the occurrence of a compensable industrial accident.

9

5.

_Id_.

This medical finding when coupled with the acknowledged

And finally, and notwithstanding all of the above, which singularly

10

and cumulatively support the finding of the occurrence of a compensable event,

11

in cases where it is difficult to determine whether an unusual circumstance

12

occurred, the benefit of the doubt must go to the Applicant.

13

Industrial Commission, Utah, 610 P.2d 1362, 1363-64 (1980).

Prows v.

14

In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the Administrative Law

15

Judge's decision that a compensable accident did not occur should be reversed

16

and remanded

17

issues presented.

for assignment

to the medical panel relative to the medical

18
19
20

DATED this 6th day of March, 1985.

21
22
DABNEY

23
24
25
26
27

VIRGINIUS MBNEY, ESQ.

28

Attorneys nor Applicant
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 84000897

RICHARD E. HOLLOWAY,

*
*
*

Applicant,

vs.
RICHARD E. HOLLOWAY TRUCKING
and/or STATE INSURANCE FUND
- Defendants.

DENIAL OF
*
*
*
*
*

MOTION FOR REVIEW

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On or about February 22, 1985, an Order was entered by an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were denied in the above
entitled case.
On or about March 6, 1985, the Commission received a Motion for
Review from the Applicant by and through his attorney.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administrative Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law
Judge dated February 22, 1985, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and
the Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied.

-^nn
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this

j&

»

/lift

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

jiay of March, 1985.

<&£&i*-^

Linda J
Commissi

isburg
'Secretary

"CL *^/^
Walter T. Axelgard
Commissioner

Lenix-e L. Nielsen
Commissioner
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I certify that on March ^27
1985, a copy of the attached
Denial of Motion for Review was mailed to the following persons at the
following addresses, postage paid:
Richard E. Holloway, 4537 South 4690 West, WVC, UT 84120
/Virginius Dabney, Atty., 136 South Main, Suite 412, SLC, UT 84101
State Insurance Fund, 560 South 300 East, SLC, UT 84111
Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrator, Second Injury Fund

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By Wilma
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed

four

(4) true and correct

copies, postage pre-paid, of the foregoing document on this the
19th day of August, 1985, to the following:
David L. Wilkinson, Esq,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Attorneys for Industrial Commission
Office of the Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Mary A. Rudolph, Esq.
BLACK & MOORE, P.C.
Attorneys for Employer/Insurance Carrier
261 East 300 South
Broadway Building - Suite
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
841j

DABNEYTHPSQL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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